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Oct 19 2010
The UK has one of the world’s most open and transparent systems for the government to
provide financial information to the public. But with the Comprehensive Spending Review
set to propose drastic programme changes and cutbacks, Joachim Wehner finds that
compared with other advanced countries there is a serious lack of oversight and scrutiny.
The results are that Parliament sees only massively under-detailed spending estimates.
Far too rapid decision-making often takes place on major budget issues, such as
cutbacks, where consequences are often poorly understood, making consensus hard to
achieve.
The International Budget Partnership launches its 2010 global survey of budget transparency, the Open
Budget Index (OBI), on 19 October, one day ahead of the publication of the Chancellor’s long-awaited
Comprehensive Spending Review. The latest OBI results once again confirm the UK’s position among a small
group of leading countries in terms of budget openness. However, complacency would be dangerous, as the
survey also highlights serious weaknesses in scrutiny practices.
The International Budget Partnership has been a leading campaigner for open budgets, complementing
efforts by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). The OBI is the only comprehensive assessment of fiscal transparency that is
conducted independent of government and at regular intervals. This campaign is of crucial importance and
deserves wide attention, in particular in the current economic and fiscal climate. Empirical studies have found
that budget transparency improves fiscal performance (Alt and Lassen 2006), lowers sovereign borrowing
costs (Glennerster and Shin 2008) and decreases corruption (Reinikka and Svensson 2004). The
International Monetary Fund (IMF 2007) maintains that budget transparency ‘helps to highlight potential risks
to the fiscal outlook that should result in an earlier and smoother fiscal policy response to changing
economic conditions, thereby reducing the incidence and severity of crises’. The danger of fudging the
numbers was dramatically illustrated earlier this year when the Greek Government came close to bankruptcy
after, once again, having to disclose substantial revisions to fiscal data.
Although the 2010 OBI survey results confirm the UK’s position among a small group of countries in which
governments provide ‘extensive information’ to the public, it also identifies worrying weaknesses in the
scrutiny process. The UK does particularly poorly in terms of parliamentary oversight, an annual charade
that I have described in a recent book as a ‘myth of fiscal control’ (Wehner 2010). Anybody who has ever
bothered to look at the Estimates provided to Parliament should be astonished by the lack of detail. Single
line items bundle together dozens of spending programmes and authorise billions of pounds. Have the
achievements of the Magna Carta, the English Bill of Rights and the Gladstonian Reforms been forgotten?
In most other democratic countries, appropriations without detailed spending information are unimaginable.
Even Australia, once a pioneer of outcome-based appropriations, has run into serious problems with such
hyper-flexible spending authority. A recent OECD study confirmed that they make it impossible to determine
what exactly money is appropriated for (Blöndal et al. 2008). The current format of the UK’s Estimates
sabotages real scrutiny.
Financial scrutiny at Westminster also suffers from a series of other handicaps. My recent book on legislative
budgeting shows that the UK Parliament is one of only a small number of national legislatures that do not
have a specialised budget or appropriations committee. Departmental select committees are supposed to
scrutinise the spending plans of bodies under their jurisdiction, but the quality of this process varies greatly
and – by international standards – remains patchy at best. In contrast, countries such as Sweden and
Germany have powerful finance and budget committees that review total spending and the way it is allocated
across sectors. Westminster lacks such strategic capacity at the committee level. This void is particularly
obvious in non-incremental times, when budget cuts have to be carefully prioritised. The danger in the UK is
that a set of executive decisions, made in a high-pressure and error-prone environment, simply gets waved
through Parliament without using the opportunity to take a second look and to iron out mistakes.
The list of institutional hurdles continues. A practice called “vote on account” allows the Government to get
on with implementing its spending proposals even without parliamentary approval. By the time this is granted,
about one third of the budget year has already expired. The UK Parliament is one of the few legislative
bodies in the OECD countries that fail to authorise spending plans prior to the start of the budget year. This
practice is an anachronism, once devised to extract concessions from the monarch. But it now ensures that
Parliament remains on the sidelines of public spending decisions.
Parliament also has much too little specialised analytic support. An important trend across OECD countries is
the creation of analytic units to support fiscal scrutiny. Once limited to the US Congressional Budget Office,
such units now exist in a wide variety of countries, such as the Netherlands, Sweden, Mexico and South
Korea. The creation of Canada’s Parliamentary Budget Officer shows the potential of such units even in the
Westminster context, where parliamentary scrutiny is constitutionally and procedurally constrained.
Worryingly, much too little attention has been paid at Westminster to how the new Office for Budget
Responsibility might be more closely linked to Parliament. The House of Commons risks falling even further
behind its peers if it misses this opportunity to ensure a strong, direct relationship with the UK’s new fiscal
council.
While the UK Parliament has long ceased to challenge executive spending proposals – the last government
defeat over Estimates dates back 90 years – careful scrutiny is now needed more than ever. To be clear, I
am not arguing here in any way that Parliament should obstruct fiscal consolidation, but the financial initiative
of the Crown ensures that this is unlikely anyway. Rather, I would urge that proper parliamentary scrutiny has
the potential to forge greater consensus around an unprecedented retrenchment exercise that has largely
been shrouded in secrecy. Coalition government is the political context that may help to revive the oldest of
Parliament’s functions. The alternative is a missed opportunity and continued irrelevance.
Dr Wehner’s book, Legislatures and the Budget Process: The Myth of Fiscal Control. (New York, Palgrave
Macmillan, 2010), provides a comprehensive coverage of how legislatures scrutinize budgets across OECD
countries and beyond.
Would you like to know more?
To access the full results of the 2010 Open Budget Survey, including detailed assessments of the UK and 93
other countries will be available from 10am (Washington, DC, time) on Tuesday, 19 October 2010 at
http://www.internationalbudget.org/.
The UK launch of the Open Budget Index will be held at 1 Carlton House Terrace, London, SW1Y 5DB on 25
October 2010, from 1 to 2:30pm.
To access the Government Spending Review source documents and key commentaries, see the clickable list
here.
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Useful links
International Budget Partnership: http://www.internationalbudget.org/
IMF Fiscal Transparency homepage: www.imf.org/external/np/fad/trans
OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency: http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/33/13/1905258.pdf
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You may also be interested in the following posts (automatically generated):
1. The government’s planned National Planning Policy Framework is a step in the right direction, but
policy makers must ensure they get the incentives right, and that decisions are made locally.
2. Nudge is no magic fix. The potential consequences of behavioural interventions need to be weighed
carefully based on an understanding of underlying behavioural processes
3. Slashing the welfare budget versus “We are all in this together”. The cumulative effect of cuts is more
serious than has yet been admitted
4. Redesigning procurement in the public sector will be a vital part of meeting budget reductions
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